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ABSTRACT
This study provides a formal analysis of the customer targeting decision problem in settings where the
cost for marketing action is stochastic and proposes a framework to efficiently estimate the decision
variables for campaign profit optimization. Targeting a customer is profitable if the positive impact
of the marketing treatment on the customer and the associated profit to the company is higher than
the cost of the treatment. While there is a growing literature on developing causal or uplift models
to identify the customers who are impacted most strongly by the marketing action, no research has
investigated optimal targeting when the costs of the action are uncertain at the time of the targeting
decision. Because marketing incentives are routinely conditioned on a positive response by the
customer, e.g. a purchase or contract renewal, stochastic costs are ubiquitous in direct marketing and
customer retention campaigns.
This study makes two contributions to the literature, which are evaluated on a coupon targeting
campaign in an e-commerce setting. First, the authors formally analyze the targeting decision problem
under response-dependent costs. Profit-optimal targeting requires an estimate of the treatment effect
on the customer and an estimate of the customer response probability under treatment. The empirical
results demonstrate that the consideration of treatment cost substantially increases campaign profit
when used for customer targeting in combination with the estimation of the average or customer-level
treatment effect. Second, the authors propose a framework to jointly estimate the treatment effect
and the response probability combining methods for causal inference with a hurdle mixture model.
The proposed causal hurdle model achieves competitive campaign profit while streamlining model
building.
The code for the empirical analysis is available on Github.
Keywords Heterogeneous Treatment Effect, Uplift Modeling, Coupon Targeting, Churn/Retention, Campaign Profit
1 Introduction
Data-driven prediction of customer behavior and the automation of campaign targeting are at the core of modern direct
marketing [1]. Direct marketing plays a key role in consumer markets with the continuous growth of e-commerce, at
1.8 trillion Euros globally in 2019 [2] as the growth of e-commerce is accompanied by a growth in online and email
advertising and in traditional print advertising, e.g. catalog marketing [3]. To make advertising profitable, businesses
have shifted away from blanket advertising and select which prospective customers to target. Targeting a customer is
profitable if the positive impact of the marketing treatment on the customer and the resulting profit to the company is
higher than the cost of the treatment.
Predicting the expected profit requires the estimation of the change in customer behavior if the customer is targeted,
know as conditional average treatment effect (CATE) [4]. Estimation of the CATE has been the focus of work under the
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
06
27
1v
1 
 [e
co
n.E
M
]  
13
 M
ar 
20
20
TREATMENT EFFECTS FOR CUSTOMER SCORING - MARCH 16, 2020
label of uplift modeling [5] and has received much attention in recent work in statistics [6, 7] and machine learning [8]
with the result that heterogeneous response to marketing treatment can be predicted more precisely.
However, profitable targeting must consider the effect of treating a customer in relation to the cost of treatment. Prior
research tends to neglect application-specific profit and cost as decision variables and instead assume an external
restriction on the number of customers to target [9, 10]. While there exists work that explicitly develops targeting
policies that optimize the profit of the marketing campaign [11], these policies are restricted to settings in which the
cost of the treatment is known at the time of the targeting decision, e.g. the production and shipping of a catalog.
Many applications in direct marketing include costs that are uncertain at the time of the targeting decision because they
are realized only when the customer accepts the marketing offer. These response-dependent costs are present whenever
a marketing incentive is conditional on a profitable customer action. Companies use conditional incentives regularly in
the form of discounts and the most salient applications have attracted much research, e.g. customer retention [12, 13] or
coupon targeting [14, 5]. Because the treatment cost is conditional on the customer action, the uncertainty about the
customer action translates into uncertainty about the realization of the cost of the incentive. The targeting decision must
then be based on comparing the expected profit to the expected cost of the marketing treatment, which is now uncertain
but can be estimated. In addition to the estimation of the CATE, estimation of the expected cost requires a model of
the customer decision under treatment. Despite the prevalence of targeted discounts in the industry and the focus of
research on customer retention and couponing, the literature has not analyzed the targeting decision problem under
response-dependent costs and lacks suitable modeling strategies to estimate both the treatment effect and customer
choice efficiently.
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, we formally analyze the targeting decision problem under
customer response-dependent costs. We show that profit-optimal targeting requires an estimate of the expected change
in profit in the form of the treatment effect and estimate of the customer response probability under treatment. Second,
we propose a framework to jointly estimate the treatment effect on profit and the absolute response probability. The two
proposed models combine methods for causal inference with a hurdle mixture model. We evaluate the effectiveness of
our approach on a coupon targeting campaign in an e-commerce setting.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing literature on the estimation of treatment effects
in customer targeting and profit-based targeting policies that consider targeting costs. Section 3.1 formally analyzes
the targeting decision under response-dependent costs. Section 3.2 introduces hurdle models within causal estimation
frameworks as flexible models of treatment effect and customer response. Section 4 introduces the data and experimental
design. The results of the experiment are evaluated in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Customer targeting subsumes research with the goal to identify which customers to target in order to maximize the
profit of a marketing campaign. Research on customer targeting has been segmented into work on specific applications
such as direct marketing and customer retention management. A starting point of our analysis is that direct marketing
and customer churn are characterized by a shared decision problem, whose cost structure has implications for the design
of targeting models. Direct marketing and churn management target specific customers with a marketing action through
communication channels including website banners, email and print marketing, but differ in the goal of the marketing
action. Direct marketing addresses customers to elicit a profitable customer response in the form of a purchase or
request for a service. The existing research defines the customer response either as conversion, i.e. if the customer has
completed a purchase in the period following the marketing action [15], or as spending, i.e. how much the customer
spent following the marketing action [16]. Customer retention management addresses customers to avoid an unfavorable
customer action and termination of the customer’s relationship with the company, commonly referred to as customer
churn [17]. Positive customer action is defined either as retention, i.e. if the individual remains an active customer, or as
customer lifetime value, i.e. the remaining net value of the customer to the company [12]. For our analysis, we refer to
the customer action in both settings as customer response, which is positive in case a purchase takes place or a customer
remains with the company, and to the spending or customer lifetime value as response value.
The fundamental decision criterion for customer targeting is the treatment effect due to the marketing action. The
treatment effect is the expected change in behavior, measured on response or response value, that is caused by the
marketing action. Recent studies on direct marketing and customer retention are careful to stress that the purpose of
targeting is to identify the customer with the highest sensitivity to the marketing action [18, 10]. The earlier practice
to base targeting decisions on the estimate of response probability favors the targeting of natural responders rather
than customers who are impacted by the marketing treatment. [11] show that conversion models may be profitable
in practice when there exists a correlation between customers’ natural propensity to respond and their sensitivity to
the marketing treatment. As there is no theoretical reason to assume such a correlation, an estimate of the response
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probability is generally insufficient to determine a profitable targeting policy as we clarify in the formal analysis of the
targeting decision problem.
Recent research has therefore focused on the estimation of the treatment effect based on observed customer charac-
teristics, commonly referred to as conditional average treatment effect (CATE). The general applicability of methods
for treatment effect estimation has lead to developments spread across fields. An comprehensive overview over recent
methodology is provided by the following studies and references therein: [4] on uplift estimation in information systems,
[19] for medical application, [20] and [21] for a more statistical perspective, and [22] for settings with continuous or
repeated experiments.
The decision whether to target a customer in the campaign depends on the treatment effect in relation to the cost of
the marketing action. While research has focused on the estimation of the treatment effect, insufficient attention has
been paid to the cost structures of customer targeting. We distinguish two types of variable costs depending on the
type of marketing treatment and communication channel. Applying the marketing action to a customer may entail
targeting-dependent variable costs that arise whenever the action is taken. In practice, targeting-dependent costs arise
for communication with the customer in the form of mail charges or call center fees and for the production of material
treatments like catalogs [16].
An important characteristic of targeting-dependent costs is that they arise when the targeting decision is made,
independent of its success. This differentiates targeting-dependent from response-dependent variable costs, which
are incurred only if the customer responds positively after receiving the marketing treatment. Response-dependent
costs arise from the design of marketing offers that are conditioned to apply only with a positive customer response. In
practice, these offers take the form of free shipping on a future purchase or a discount on an existing service contract
[23]. The value of the offer can be fixed, as in the case of coupon codes for free shipping, or relative to the response
value, as for discounts on a monthly subscription fee. In both cases, if the customer responds negatively, for example,
by terminating the existing contract, then the offer entails no cost for the company.
Beyond variable costs related to the targeting of individual customers, the implementation of a marketing campaign
entails fixed costs for the design of the marketing action and the development of the targeting policy. While the fixed
costs of the campaign are an important strategic consideration, they do not affect the operational targeting decision for
individual customers.
The existence of targeting-dependent and response-dependent costs must be taken into account when designing targeting
policies to maximize the profit of campaigns in direct marketing and churn. Despite the relevance of targeting costs for
the targeting decision, the literature provides little discussion of customer targeting as a policy problem. [24] provide an
analytical discussion of profit optimization under exclusively targeting-dependent variable costs. Targeting a customer
is then profitable when the incremental value of the marketing action is at least as high as its cost. The assumption of
targeting-dependent costs is natural for print advertising and the decision rule is applied by [11] in the setting of catalog
marketing, where the targeting cost is incurred by printing and sending a catalog. [23] formulate the campaign profit
specific to customer retention campaigns including an estimate of the response value and response-dependent as well as
targeting-dependent variable costs. We provide a comprehensive discussion of this formulation, its implicit assumptions
and related issues and its relation to our results in Appendix A and summarize our findings here.The churn campaign
profit formulation includes a targeting-dependent contact cost and a response-dependent cost of the incentive to the
firm in case the offer is accepted, but makes two restrictive assumptions. It implies that treatment effects are strictly
positive and assumes a constant probability for customers to accept the offer when treated [25]. Assuming the same
response probability for customers who receive the treatment ignores the heterogeneous sensitivity of customers to
the treatment and the effect of the treatment on the expected cost, resulting in non-optimal targeting. [26] relax the
assumption of a constant response probability and discuss campaign profit from the uplift perspective, but focus on
model evaluation rather than model estimation and uphold the assumption of a positive treatment effect. We add to
the literature by providing a formal analysis of the general targeting decision problem, which considers variation in
treatment effects over customers and guides model estimation under target-dependent and response-dependent costs.
As an alternative to a decision-theoretic approach for expected profit maximization, the literature has suggested the
empirical optimization of the targeting policy [27]. A popular approach towards empirical campaign optimization is to
determine a threshold for the predicted treatment effect above which customers are targeted. Prior studies heuristically
select the threshold that would have targeted the k deciles of the sample with the highest estimated CATE [24, 28, 10, 5].
The optimal proportion of the population to target can be approximated by comparing the group-wise average treatment
effect for customers within each decile of the CATE estimates, since a correct ranking of customers by their CATE
implies that the average treatment effect in groups with high model estimates must be higher than in groups with low
model estimates. The evaluation of the model’s ability to rank customers by their expected treatment effect is in line
with industry practice to target a small group of the most profitable prospective customers, but ignores the cost of
targeting to determine the size of the campaign. An advantage of the empirical approach is that it remains feasible when
the CATE estimates are a biased or badly calibrated estimate of the ITE or when the profit and costs parameters of
3
TREATMENT EFFECTS FOR CUSTOMER SCORING - MARCH 16, 2020
the campaign are unknown. When there exists heterogeneity in response value or costs, ranking the customer by their
expected treatment effect ignores variation in expected profit that is not due to variation in sensitivity to the treatment.
Note that response-dependent costs imply variation in expected cost even when the nominal cost of the treatment is
constant. Under profit or cost heterogeneity, empirical thresholding of the treatment effect will not result in an optimal
targeting policy, as we show in the empirical analysis.
In summary, we find that customer targeting in applications including direct marketing and customer churn requires the
consideration of the treatment effect and variable targeting costs. Targeting costs take the form of targeting-dependent
costs and response-dependent costs, which are realized if the customer responds positively to the treatment. The next
section provides an analysis of the customer targeting problem in settings that include customer-level heterogeneity in
variable costs.
3 Methodology
3.1 Optimal Decision Making in Customer Targeting
The customer targeting decision problem is characterized by three components, 1) the value to the marketer conditional
on the customer response, 2) the treatment cost conditional on the targeting decision and 3) the treatment cost conditional
on the customer response. The existence of response-dependent costs differentiates most retention and coupon campaign
settings from the cost setting discussed in previous studies [24], which assumes that all cost components are conditional
on the targeting decision, but independent of the customer response.
Let Ci ∈ 0, 1 be a random variable indicating an action by customer i, who is described by a set of observed covariates
Xi. We define Ci = 1 as an event with a positive impact on business profit, for example, a purchase by the customer
for couponing or customer retention in churn modeling. Further, let Vi ∈ R+ be the gross profit before targeting costs
that is associated with a positive customer action. Vi represents the customer lifetime value in churn prevention or the
margin of a purchase in direct marketing and may show substantial variation across customers. For convenience, let
Yi = Ci · Vi be the observed profit of the targeting decision, excluding targeting cost. Note that Yi = Vi when Ci = 1
and Yi = 0 otherwise. The probability of a positive response p(C = 1|Xi) and the expected response value E[V |Xi]
are unknown at the time of the marketing decision and need to be estimated given the customer characteristics.
Recall that the variable costs split into two components, the targeting-dependent and response-dependent costs. Let c
be a targeting-dependent cost that is constant and independent of the customer characteristics. Targeting-dependent
costs can be contact costs, for example, mail charges. Let δ be a response-dependent cost that applies if the customer
responds positively after receiving the marketing treatment. The response-dependent cost can be associated with a
marketing incentive that is conditioned on a positive customer response, for example, a voucher for free shipping for
the current purchase process. The expected response-dependent cost at the time of targeting depends on the probability
that the customer will accept the offer. Besides, response-dependent costs may depend on the value of the response.
When the marketing treatment is a relative discount, for example, in the form of 10% discount on the current purchase,
the nominal discount depends on the completion of the purchase and the purchase amount. The expected offer cost then
depends on the probability of a positive customer response and the value of the response. If a customer is not targeted
by the campaign then no variable costs occur and δ = c = 0.
Table 1 summarizes decision problems in target marketing by outlining their respective cost structure and anticipates the
results of the decision analysis. The decision problems vary in the existence of the treatment- and response-dependent
costs, the type of response-dependent incentive and assumptions about the treatment effect on response probability and
value. We see that targeting-dependent costs apply to one stream of research with applications in catalog marketing [11]
and online banner advertising [29]. The proposed decision framework applies under any combination of variable costs
and is crucial whenever there are response-dependent costs. We further differentiate the response-dependent costs into
offers with a fixed value, e.g. retention campaigns with a discount upon contract renewal [26], and offers with a value
equal to a percentage of the response value, e.g. coupon banners in a webshop [5]. The decision analysis determines
the decision variables indicated in the last column. These are the variables required to calculate the expected profit
of the targeting decision in the specific setting as a result of our analysis. Note that the set of decision variables may
simplify when assuming no treatment effect on the value given conversion for the first and last setting. We will discuss
this assumption as a special case below.
Consider an available marketing treatment and let Ti be a variable to indicate if the treatment was applied to customer
i. We consider a single treatment and assume Ti ∈ 0, 1, where T = 1 indicates that the customer is targeted, the
treatment condition, and T = 0 indicates that she is not, the control condition. The following analysis is easily
extended to more than one treatment by considering multiple binary comparisons. The treatment is designed to increase
the conversion probability of the customer or her value given conversion or both. Following the Neyman-Rubin
4
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Table 1: Decision problems in customer targeting and their decision variables
Cost
Treatment-Depend. Response-Depend. Treatment Effect on
Application Example Fixed Percentage Decision Value Decision Variables
Advertisement
Letter and Present1 yes no no yes no p(1)− p(0), R
Online Banner2 no* no no yes no p(1)− p(0)
Catalog3 yes no no yes yes Y (1)− Y (0)
Online Banner no* no no yes yes Y (1)− Y (0)
Discount
Print Retention Offer4 yes yes no yes yes Y (1)− Y (0), p(1)
Online Fixed Value no* yes no yes yes Y (1)− Y (0), p(1)
Print Discount yes no yes yes yes Y (1)− Y (0), p(1), R(1)
Coupon Banner5 no* no yes yes yes Y (1)− Y (0), p(1), R(1)
Coupon Banner no* no yes yes no p(1), p(0)
*We consider online marketing on the company’s own website or in the form of email newsletters. Programmatic advertising
on third party websites has a complex cost structure due to the underlying auction process.
1[10] 2[29] 3[11]
4[26] 5[5]
potential outcome model, we indicate the potential outcomes under treatment using ·(0) and ·(1). For example, Ci(1)
denotes the conversion outcome if customer i is targeted, whereas Ci(0) denotes the conversion outcome if she is
not targeted. The individual treatment effect (ITE) on profit is then τi = Yi(1)− Yi(0) = Ci(1)Vi(1)− Ci(0)Vi(0).
We further distinguish between the ITE on response probability τCi = Ci(1)− Ci(0) and the ITE on response value
τVi = Vi(1)− Vi(0).
We now begin our analysis of the targeting decision problem. The profit pii for an individual in the marketing campaign
including treatment costs is
pii =
{
Ci(0)Vi(0) if Ti = 0
Ci(1)Vi(1)− Ci(1)δ − c if Ti = 1
The general decision problem whether to target a specific customer under response-dependent costs can then be posed
as
pi(1)(Vi(1)− δ)− c > pi(0) · Vi(0), (1)
where we use pi as a convenient shorthand for p(C = 1|X = xi). Note how the variable costs affect the campaign
profit. The target-dependent costs c are realized before the customer makes any decision and are therefore independent
of the customer action. The response-dependent costs δ are realized only when a positive response takes place.
Solving the inequality for the treatment effect yields
pi(1)Vi(1)− pi(0)Vi(0) > pi(1)δ + c (2)
The optimal decision naturally depends on the individual treatment effect on the profit on the left side of the equation.
However, it also depends on the probability of a positive customer response under treatment as a mitigating factor
on the offer cost. Intuitively, the absolute offer costs are a promise from the firm and must be discounted by the
chance that the promise will in fact be redeemed by the customer. If the customer does not redeem the offer, then the
response-dependent costs are not incurred by the company. The customer targeting decision under response-dependent
costs thus differs from the case where δ = 0 because the costs are now stochastic rather than known at the point of the
targeting decision.
The optimization of expected profit underlying Eq. 2 implies that, when faced with two customers with an identical
CATE, it is more profitable to target the customer who is less likely to respond positively and accept the marketing
offer. The previous practice to target customers with a high response probability after treatment not only disregards
the causal effect of the treatment, as previous literature has pointed out [10], but increases the cost of campaigns by
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targeting customer with high expected response-dependent cost. To clarify the intuition behind this result, consider
the treatment of a customer as an investment with probabilistic cost. If the payout of two investments is identical, a
rational agent prefers the investment that has lower expected cost. This result suggests that when there is little or no
treatment heterogeneity, meaning that the payout of the treatment is identical between customers, it is profitable to
target customers with a lower rather than higher probability to respond.
In practical terms, any decision setting with response-dependent costs will require an estimate of the treatment effect
pi(1)Vi(1)− pi(0)Vi(0) and an estimate of the response probability pi(1). This result is surprising because previous
literature has emphasized uplift models, which provide an estimate of the treatment effect, as a direct replacement of
response models, which provide an estimate of the conversion probability. The decision under response-dependent
costs requires both a model of the treatment and a model of the conversion probability under treatment.
In application, a positive expected profit may not result in an optimal policy under strategic considerations. Actual
targeting campaigns are regularly evaluated by their return on advertising spend (ROAS). The ROAS is defined as the
ratio of campaign profit over campaign costs. Note that the same information is sometimes expressed by its inverse as
the cost-revenue ratio. The ROAS is a metric of advertising efficiency and as such does not consider campaign size.
While it is generally not profit-optimal to maximize efficiency at the cost of targeting fewer customers, a minimum
ROAS is often required in practice to satisfy management goals and allocate resources efficiently between marketing
channels or campaigns. A side result of our analysis is that the proposed decision rule can be used to set targeting
thresholds to reflect a minimum ROAS as
pi(1)Vi(1)− pi(0)Vi(0)
pi(1) · δ + c ≥ Target ROAS
We go on to discuss two special cases that arise in digital applications.
First, assume that c = 0. In digital marketing settings, there are no variable contact costs if customer communication is
digital and automated. In particular, the costs for email targeting and banner campaigns on company’s own websites
arise in the form of fixed cost into infrastructure, e.g. content management systems and content production. These costs
are irrelevant for operational targeting decisions in the short run. The targeting rule is then
pi(1)Vi(1)− pi(0)Vi(0) > pi(1) · δ
pi(1)(Vi(1)− δ) > pi(0)Vi(0) (3)
Assume additionally that offer costs depend linearly on the response value, i.e. δi = ηVi(1). The latter assumption
corresponds to discount coupons that reduce the checkout amount by a fixed percentage, e.g. 10%, and other forms
of dynamic pricing. Percentage discount coupons are frequently used in online marketing as a transparent means to
differentiate incentives according to the value of customers and as an incentive that encourages higher spending. The
decision rule for discount offers requires an estimate of the expected response value under treatment:
pi(1)Vi(1)− pi(0)Vi(0) > pi(1) · δi
pi(1)Vi(1)− pi(0)Vi(0) > pi(1) · η · Vi(1) (4)
Second, there exists a special case of the decision problem in Eq. 4 that requires no estimate of the purchase value.
Assume that the treatment affects the conversion probability but not the response value, i.e. V (1) = V (0). Then
equation 4 reduces to
(pi(1)− pi(0)) · Vi > pi(1) · η · Vi
pi(1) >
pi(0)
1− η (5)
Note that under the combined assumptions of a percentage discount with no fixed contact cost and no effect on
conversion value, the decision rule becomes independent of the individual purchase value. Intuitively, a negligible
communication cost removes the need to make up for the cost of customer targeting. Further making the coupon cost
dependent on the response value automatically adjusts the cost to decrease with smaller response values and vice versa.
In practice, this setting requires estimation of the purchase probabilities with and without treatment.
The two special cases imply that the cost structure, which is determined by the infrastructure of the campaign and the
design of the treatment, can increase or reduce the complexity of the decision problem. In general, when the cost of
the treatment is conditioned on additional variables, then the estimation of these variables is relevant for the decision
problem. We can see that percentage discounts on the purchase value introduce an estimate of the purchase value
under treatment into the decision (Eq. 4). Similar arguments can be made for more specialized coupon design like a
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minimum purchase value or a staggered discount increasing with purchase value. The second case shows that specific
cost structures may simplify the decision problem. Under the additional assumption of no treatment effect on value, the
targeting decision reduces to the estimation of the probabilities of purchase with and without treatment in Eq. 5.
The proposed decision framework is a generalization of marketing decision settings discussed in the literature. Prior
research in marketing has considered campaigns with treatment-related but no response-related costs, such as traditional
mail catalog marketing [24, 11]. Assuming δ = 0, we can show that the treatment effect on profit Yi is sufficient for the
targeting decision in these cases, which reduces to
pi(1)Vi(1)− pi(0)Vi(0) > c (6)
We see immediately that an estimate of the treatment effect on the profit pi(1)Vi(1)− pi(0)Vi(0) = Y (1)− Y (0) is
a sufficient decision criterion under the conditions of Eq. 6. If we assume no treatment effect on the value such that
Vi(1) = Vi(0) = Vi and assume Vi to be known or modeled independently, we recover
pi(1)− pi(0) > c
Vi
, (7)
where the focus lies on the estimation of the treatment effect on the customer response. This recovers the estimation
problem addressed by prior research under the label of uplift modeling, although the dependency on the response value
is not typically discussed in the literature [4].1
In summary, the treatment effect is not sufficient for profit-based targeting in settings with response-dependent costs.
The additional decision variables required for the targeting decision depend on the cost-structure of the marketing
treatment as given in Table 1. For variable costs with a fixed value, the purchase probability under treatment determines
the cost as in Eq. 2. For treatment with a value relative to the purchase value, the purchase probability under treatment
and the purchase value under treatment jointly determine the effective treatment cost as in Eq. 4. Both cost structures
are common in direct marketing. The following sections discuss a model specification to estimate the cost-related
decision variables p(1) and R(1) within the model of the treatment effect Y (1)− Y (0).
3.2 Causal Hurdle Models
The targeting decision under response-dependent costs (Eq. 2) requires estimates of the treatment effect Y (1)− Y (0),
the response probability under treatment pi(1) and, for discount coupons, the response value under treatment Vi(1).
Alternatively, we can decompose the profit using Yi = Ci·Vi and estimate the treatment effect as pi(1)Vi(1)−pi(0)Vi(0).
This formulation makes explicit that the additional decision variables are contained within the treatment effect on profit.
The remainder of the study develops a framework to simplify the modeling task based on this observation.
A straight-forward approach to estimate the decision variables is to build several models, where one (causal) model
estimates the CATE τˆi and additional models to estimate remaining decision variables under treatment. In the following,
we will call this the distinct modeling approach. The distinct modeling approach requires one model to estimate pi(1),
a second model to estimate Vi(1) in the case of discount coupons, and one to four models depending on the specific
approach to estimate the CATE. In other words, the distinct modeling of each decision variable introduces up to two
additional models to the CATE model.
In the following, we propose a framework to avoid additional model complexity and simultaneously estimate the
treatment effect on expected profit, the purchase probability and purchase value. The proposed framework exploits the
decomposition of the expected profit into the conversion probability pi(1) and purchase value Vi(1) to collect estimates
for pi(1) and Vi(1) from the treatment effect model. We estimate Vi(1) and pi(1) jointly within the profit model by
modeling the observed profit from customer Yi as a two-stage hurdle structure.
Hurdle models, known as Tobit II models in econometrics, are mixture models over two distributions, one of which has
a point mass at zero, which were previously applied in applications of customer choice [30, 31]. They are convenient to
model decisions that involve a binary decision on whether to act, the hurdle, and a conditional decision on the value
associated with acting. Hurdle models assume that the occurrence of zeros is entirely driven by a first-stage process, i.e.
the second stage value is zero when the first stage decision is a negative response and strictly positive when the first
stage decision is a positive response.
The hurdle model allows us to decompose the estimation of the profit Y into the estimation of response C and response
value R. The probability mass function of the hurdle model is
Pr(Yi = y|Xi = x) =
{
(1− Pr(C = 1|Xi = x)) · 0 if Yi = 0
Pr(C = 1|Xi = x) · Pr(Vi = v|Xi = x) if Yi > 0 (8)
1See [10, fn. 27] for a brief mention of the issue in the case of customer churn.
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where Pr(Ci = 1|X = xi)) is a model for customer response and Pr(Vi = v|Xi = x) is a model of response value.
If a customer chooses to respond, they decide on their spending behavior in the second stage, which determines the
response value to the firm. The profit from a response is zero if a customer chooses not to respond and strictly positive
otherwise.
The hurdle model specification has two properties that are relevant in the context of customer choice. First, the
separation of the purchase decision and value decision facilitates the estimation and interpretation of each model. In
the context of treatment estimation, separating the effect on response probability and response value provides a more
nuanced understanding of marketing effectiveness and can be used to improve the treatment. The model structure also
accommodates differences in, for example, the relevance of available covariates for each decision step [30]. Second, the
models for the prediction of response probability and response value can be estimated separately when the purchase
incidence is observed and we assume independent error terms [32, p. 545]. This property will provide additional
flexibility when estimating the proposed causal hurdle model in practice.
It remains to integrate the hurdle model into a framework for causal inference. Under the common assumptions of
the potential outcome framework, i.e. unconfoundedness, overlap and stable unit treatment value, the CATE can be
expressed as the difference between the outcome Yi conditional on treatment assignment Ti and covariates Xi,
τ(x) = E[Y (1)− Y (0)] = E[Y |Xi = x, T = 1]− E[Y |Xi = x, T = 0]. (9)
We integrate the hurdle model into the standard treatment effect model by modeling profit with the hurdle model
Pr(Yi = y|Ti = t,Xi = x) =
{
1− Pr(C = 1|Xi = x, Ti = t) if Yi = 0
Pr(C = 1|Xi = x, Ti = t) · Pr(Vi = v|Xi = x, Ti = t) if Yi > 0 (10)
where both the conversion probability and the purchase value conditional on conversion depend on the treatment
assignment Ti and the covariates Xi.
Following the definition of the hurdle model above and under the assumptions of the potential outcome framework, we
specify our causal hurdle model as
τˆ(Xi) = yˆ(Xi, 1)− yˆ(Xi, 0)
= p(C = 1|Xi, T = 1) · E[R|Xi, T = 1]− p(C = 1|Xi, T = 0) · E[R|Xi, T = 0]. (11)
Estimating the treatment effect on response probability and response value separately has an additional advantage if
we expect heterogeneity of effect direction and size on customer value and response probability. This is the case if
individual customers react differently to the same offer, for example, purchase their basket with higher probability or
put additional products into their basket in response to receiving the treatment. Further, we expect the treatment effect
on probability and value to be closely connected to the design of the marketing action. Under strong heterogeneity, we
expect some customers to react to the marketing treatment by increasing the response value, e.g. putting more products
into their basket, while becoming more reluctant to respond at the higher value, e.g. abandon a high-value shopping
basket. Explicit estimates of the disentangled treatment effects are then relevant for treatment selection and design.
Figure 1: Causal hurdle model structure. Frames indicate the two proposed strategies
for estimation in the form of two hurdle models (dashed blue) or two causal single
models (solid red)
The formulation in Eq. 10 does not restrict the specific method of causal inference. Figure 1 visualizes the general
structure of causal hurdle models and makes the estimation targets explicit. We see that one strategy to estimate
all relevant decision variables is to estimate four separate models, i.e. one model each for purchase probability and
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purchase value times one model each for the treatment and control group. This two-model hurdle model is equivalent
to combining the two-model approach for CATE estimation with two hurdle models for which the choice and value
components are estimated separately [32, p. 545].
It is possible to simplify the estimation by estimating more than one decision variable jointly. Eq. 9 is the starting
point for two approaches to integrating a hurdle model structure into treatment effect models. Figure 1 visualizes the
proposed methods to reduce the number of separate models by joint estimation of variables horizontally (solid red),
over treatment and control group, or vertically (dashed blue), over purchase probability and value.
The single-model hurdle model combines the single model approach for causal inference with a two-stage estimation
procedure for the hurdle model. A general model for the conditional profit with or without treatment takes the form
y = f(x, t) and predicts the return given the covariates X and treatment assignment T . Despite its simplicity, this
single model approach has been found to provide competitive CATE estimates for sufficiently flexible specifications
of f(·) [21]. The single two-stage approach estimates one model for the response probability and one model for the
customer value each jointly over the control and treatment group (Figure 1, solid red). Following the single model
approach, we include the treatment variable as a covariate into the model. By choosing a flexible parametrization f(·),
we can model the conditional average treatment effect through the interaction between Ti and covariates Xi within the
model [33].
4 Experimental Design
We evaluate the proposed methodology in an online couponing setting2. The decision analysis summarized in Table
1 identifies online couponing as a particularly interesting decision problem because showing a coupon banner to the
customer entails no targeting-dependent cost while the coupon value constitutes a substantial response-dependent cost.
However, studies on online couponing are scarce in the literature and we are not aware of research considering its cost
setting [14, 5].
A German online fashion retailer deploys an automated targeting system that can show website visitors of the online
shop an offer for a discount on their purchase. Targeted customers receive a coupon code that provides a discount
of AC 10 at checkout. The code is made available to the customer through a banner on the webpage, which states the
discount offer and displays a coupon code to be entered during the checkout process. The banner is shown repeatedly
on subsequent page views within the same session to ensure that the customer is aware of the offer. The discount is
subject to common terms and conditions that require a minimum checkout value of AC 50 for the coupon to be usable.
The operational question of the fashion retailer is to identify the customers whose incremental margin when being
targeted is strictly larger than the expected cost due to the coupon. As the theoretical analysis shows, the profit-optimal
targeting policy differs from similar target marketing settings discussed in previous studies as the expected cost of the
coupon depends on the customer’s purchase probability.
The data contains information on 118,622 anonymized website visitors in the form of 50 variables collected through
tracking software and the shop system. Variables include information on the user history, e.g. the number of previous
visits, the behavior on the website, e.g. the number of clicks on the website, and the current shopping basket, e.g. the
number of items and their total price [34]. 9% of website visitors convert and complete their purchase with a median
purchase value of AC 75. We remove 1,459 outliers with a substantially higher basket value between AC 300 and AC 1750
corresponding to the 2.5% percentile of the purchase value distribution.
The data fulfills the assumptions of the potential outcome framework. The unconfoundedness and overlap assumptions
are met by design through randomizing treatment assignment, which is common practice in customer targeting
applications. The stable unit treatment assumption value requires that social interaction effects between individuals
are rare or small in size. This assumption has recently been challenged for the telecommunications industry [35]. The
social network that customers form when communicating via the telecommunication network have been found to lead
to substantial positive spillover effects from the targeted customers to their connections. In online shopping, while
there is potential for social effects, e.g. sharing information about the availability of coupons on the website, there
are no social mechanisms inherent to the purchase process. We therefore assume that any potential social effects are
insubstantial for our analysis, but encourage additional research on social effects in couponing applications.
Evaluation of approaches including the estimation of treatment effects is complicated by the fact that the true ITE is
unobservable, so comparable studies rely on simulated data [6, 36]. To facilitate the evaluation of the proposed approach
through a setting where the treatment effect is known, we conduct an empirical Monte Carlo study combining the
observed covariates X and customer spending Y with a simulation of ITE [36]. We simulate the overall treatment effect
2The code for the experiment and evaluation is available at https://github.com/Humboldt-WI/
response-dependent-costs
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τ(X) as a combination of the treatment effect on the conversion probability τC(X) and the purchase value conditional
on a purchase τR(X). Each treatment effect is determined by a linear combination of covariates with coefficients drawn
randomly following
βC , βR ∼ N (0k, Ik)
τC(X) = X
>
τ βC
τR(X) = X
>
τ βR
where Xτ is a subset of k = 11 selected variables from the full set of variables. Both treatment effects are centered and
scaled. To simulate a realistic marketing setting, we scale the ITE distribution to have most of its mass in the range
[0;10] and a positive average effect [11, Fig. 12]. For the ITE on response probability, we center the distribution around
an ATE of 5 percentage points and truncate the simulated values to the range [-0.1,0.15]. For the ITE on response value,
we center the distribution around an ATE of AC 1 and truncate the simulated values to the range [-10,10].
We simulate the potential outcome with and without treatment by flipping the observed outcome label for observations in
the treatment group chosen randomly in proportion to their τC(Xi) as in [36]. We do not observe the potential checkout
amount for 4680 customers whose outcome we flip from non-converted to converted. We choose not to remove these
customers and instead approximate the data generating process of the checkout amount to generate synthetic values.
We employ a gradient boosted tree ensemble (GBT) on the customers for which we observed the checkout amount to
ensure that the approximating model is sufficiently flexible and predict the unobserved checkout amounts using the
tree ensemble. The treatment effect τR is then added to the observed, or if unavailable to the synthetic, basket value.
The empirical Monte Carlo approach allows us to evaluate our approach against the actual distribution of customers
including the real purchase process while controlling the individual treatment effect for evaluation.
We use five-fold cross-validation to compare the causal hurdle model and the distinct modeling approach on the holdout
data. Considering the estimation strategies for the treatment effect and the conversion probability results in the eight
combinations summarized in Table 2. The proposed approaches to model the treatment effect using hurdle models are
grouped as causal hurdle models. They are defined by a two-stage hurdle approach estimating the response probability
and the response value given a positive response, with and without treatment. The hurdle specification provides an
estimate of the conversion probability under treatment without the need to estimate an additional model. The distinct
modeling approaches are defined by the estimation of the treatment effect on profit in one stage. Approaches that
estimate the treatment effect on profit require the estimation of a separate model to estimate the conversion probability
under treatment. For each approach, we compare a linear specification to a more flexible specification using the GBT.
To simplify the analysis for the distinct modeling approaches, we choose the same specification for the models of the
treatment effect and the conversion probability.
Table 2: Summary of model specifications considered in the experiment
Architecture Number
Stages CATE Model Conversion Model Estimator of Models
Causal Hurdle Models
hurdle single-model - gbt 2
hurdle two-model - linear 4
hurdle two-model - gbt 4
Distinct Modeling Approaches
one-stage single-model separate gbt 2
one-stage two-model separate linear 3
one-stage two-model separate gbt 3
one-stage dr separate linear 5
one-stage dr separate gbt 5
We consider three approaches for the estimation of the CATE. First, the single-model approach that includes the
treatment variable into the model. We test the single-model approach only in combination with the GBT specification
because the approach requires a sufficiently flexible model to capture interaction effects between the treatment indicator
and covariates. The single-model approach requires the estimation of two models. Under the hurdle model approach,
the two models are one single-model including the treatment indicator respectively for the conversion and spending
given conversion. Under the distinct modeling approach, the two models are a single-model for the profit and a separate
model for conversion under treatment.
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Second, the two-model approach that relies on the estimation of separate models for the treatment and control group.
For the distinct modeling approach, the two models estimate the expected profit in the treatment and control group,
respectively, with a separate model for conversion under treatment. For the hurdle approach, the two models for the
treatment and control group are hurdle models that each consist of one model for the conversion and one model for the
spending given conversion.
Third, the doubly-robust outcome transformation (DR) due to [37]. The DR approach provides an additional benchmark
that has shown strong empirical performance in the econometric literature [20]. Under the DR approach, the treatment
effect is estimated using a single model on a transformation of the profit
Y DRi = µ1 − µ0 +
Ti(Yi − µ1)
p(T = 1|Xi) −
(1− Ti)(Yi − µ0)
1− p(T = 1|Xi)
with µ1 = E[Y |Xi = x, Ti = 1] and µ0 = E[Y |Xi = x, Ti = 0]
The expected profit in the treatment and control group, E[Y |Xi, Ti = 1] and E[Y |Xi, Ti = 0], and the probability to
receive treatment, p(T = 1|Xi), are estimated by three auxiliary models. For simplicity, we use linear regression to
estimate the expected profit and logistic regression to estimate the probability to receive treatment.
5 Empirical Results
Recall that each targeting policy is a combination of an estimate of the treatment effect and an estimate of the treatment
cost. The profit generated by the targeting policy depends on the quality of the estimates of the treatment effect and on
the quality of the estimates of the conversion probability under treatment. The analysis is therefore structured around the
evaluation of the treatment effect estimation and the evaluation of the estimation of the expected individual-specific cost
in the proposed hurdle framework. First, we test if the conversion probability estimates are sufficiently informative and
economically relevant for profitable targeting. We propose that the expected individual cost is practically relevant and
the estimate p(C|Xi, T = 1) is sufficiently precise for profitable targeting. We test their economical relevance through
an evaluation of campaign profit. Second, we test if the CATE estimates in the proposed causal hurdle framework
are equivalent to CATE estimates under the conventional modeling strategy. The campaign profit under joint model
estimation is expected to be at least as high as under the distinct model approach, while being easier to manage in
application. Therefore, we evaluate the CATE estimates using statistical metrics on the simulated treatment effect and
the evaluation of campaign profit under population-based cost estimates.
Third, we test if the proposed analytical targeting policy has a higher return than empirically optimized policies. The
analytical targeting policy the individual treatment effect and response probability that requires a combination of
treatment effect estimation with individual-level cost estimation. We test the campaign profit of the policy under the
distinct estimation approach and the proposed causal hurdle framework.
The incremental campaign profit must be determined against baseline policies. As a general baseline, we select the
sum of profit from individuals in the data when no campaign is run, i.e. no individual is targeted with the marketing
treatment. We compare the proposed analytical targeting policy against the alternative Empirical policy suggested by
our literature review, which determines a targeting threshold that maximizes campaign profit on the training data [38].
5.1 Profit Implications of Individual Cost Estimates
We begin with the prediction of conversion probability under treatment to calculate the expected cost of targeting. Table
3 reports the profit and the fraction of customers treated for campaigns under the proposed targeting policy stated in Eq.
2 (Analytical). We evaluate the conversion probability estimates provided under the estimation procedures described by
the columns Conversion Model and Estimator. To calculate the expected cost, the analysis includes the model-based
approaches discussed above and, for comparison, the expected conversion rate in the population. The conversion rate
assumes a constant conversion probability for all customers, which implies a homogeneous treatment cost that is often
assumed in studies on cost-sensitive learning [39, 40]. The conversion estimates are combined with two estimation
procedures of the treatment effect to calculate the campaign profit. The treatment effect for each customer is either
estimated to be the average treatment effect over all customers in the training data, denoted as ATE, or presumed to
be estimated perfectly, denoted as Actual. The ATE policy makes the simplifying assumption that there exists no
heterogeneity in treatment effects and is equivalent to the constant acceptance rate of the treatment assumed in prior
studies on customer churn [41, 25]. Beyond the comparison to prior research, the ATE policy provides an estimate
of the profit implication of the cost-based targeting alone. Presuming perfect estimation of the ITE is unrealistic in
practice, since the true treatment effect is unobservable. As a second comparison, the campaign profit under the actual
ITE provides an upper bound on campaign profit that would be achievable by estimation of individual-level cost under
optimal performance of the treatment effect model.
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Table 3: Policy profit for the conversion models evaluated under selected treatment effect estimation methods
Architecture Profit FractionTreatedPolicy CATE Model Conversion Model Estimator
Baseline - - - 46,236 0.00
Analytical ATE Conversion Rate - 50,830 1.00
Analytical ATE Single-Model GBT 52,931 0.84
Analytical ATE Two-Model/Distinct Linear 51,936 0.76
Analytical ATE Two-Model/Distinct GBT 52,402 0.79
Analytical Actual Conversion Rate - 55,493 0.71
Analytical Actual Single-Model GBT 56,696 0.72
Analytical Actual Two-Model/Distinct Linear 57,361 0.69
Analytical Actual Two-Model/Distinct GBT 57,022 0.69
Table 3 shows that customer-level estimates of the conversion rate provide a more accurate estimate of customer-level
costs and translate into higher campaign profit when used in combination with either ATE or CATE estimates. To
provide some context for the profit of the models of interest, consider the two simple policies of targeting no or every
individual in the population. The Baseline policy, under which no customer is targeted, results in a profit of AC 46,236.
This profit is the result of the natural probability in the customer population to complete a purchase, which we hope to
increase with the marketing campaign. Next, consider the average treatment effect of the population and the average
conversion rate of the population given treatment. The analytical policy indicates to target all customers given the
positive expected average return. The treatment rate of 100% results in a profit of AC 50,830. The campaign profit
defined as the difference between the campaign and no marketing incentive is AC 4,594.
We now introduce an individual-level targeting policy by estimating the cost of the marketing treatment on the customer
level with a response model. Both the two-model and single-model architectures result in a substantial decrease in the
fraction of customers treated from 100% to 76%–84%, depending on the estimator. The decrease in treatment ratio is
accompanied by an increase in campaign profit between AC 1,100 and AC 2,100, again depending on the estimator. This
substantial increase of 24-46% in campaign profit compared to universal treatment is the direct result of controlling the
expected treatment cost for each customer.
The observed positive impact on profit generalizes to customer-level targeting based on the CATE under treatment
effect heterogeneity. A hypothetical targeting policy based on the actual ITE and the average cost results in a campaign
profit of AC 55,493. We again find that campaign profit using customer-level estimates of the treatment cost increase
campaign profit by AC 1,200–AC 1,900.
Compare now the two-model approach and single model approach with the GBT estimator. The single model GBT
results in a campaign profit of AC 50,830 and AC 56,696, while the two-model GBT results in a profit of AC 52,402 and
AC 57,022, for the constant and true treatment estimates respectively. We conclude that the campaign profit under the
single-model conversion model is slightly lower than from the campaign profit under the two-model conversion model.
5.2 Profit Implications of Causal Hurdle Models
The analysis was so far restricted to the conversion models and the effect of customer-level cost estimation. Considering
the probability of each customer to accept the costly marketing incentive directly results in a substantial profit increase.
We therefore conclude that the estimate p(C|Xi, T = 1) is sufficiently precise for profitable targeting and that the
expected individual cost is practically relevant for customer targeting. The conclusion applies to campaigns considering
heterogeneous treatment effects and population-level estimates of the average treatment effect. In contrast to prior work
[5], our analysis implies that customers with a positive response to treatment can be unprofitable targets due to a high
conversion probability after treatment and the associated higher expected treatment cost.
We now consider the estimation of the CATE for the customer-level prediction of marketing effectiveness. We evaluate
the quality of the CATE models using statistical indicators and the resulting profit as part of a targeting policy.
Table 4 shows the root-mean- squared error (RMSE) of the CATE estimates compared to the simulated treatment effect
on profit and the transformed outcome loss (TOL) on the observed outcomes. We include the TOL as a feasible metric
when the true treatment effect is not simulated and therefore not known [42]. To put the results into context, the ATE
estimate provides the baseline obtained by a constant estimator, while the actual ITE in the last row provides the lowest
obtainable TOL on the data. Kernel density plots showing the distributional fit of the CATE estimates are available in
Figure 2 in the Appendix.
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Table 4: Quality of model estimates for the conditional average treatment effect
Architecture Error
CATE Model Stages Estimator RMSE TOL
ATE - - 2.75 3387.90
Single-Model Hurdle GBT 2.37 3384.91
Two-Model Hurdle Linear 5.15 3410.78
Two-Model Hurdle GBT 1.94 3381.79
Single-Model One-Stage GBT 2.77 3387.49
Two-Model One-Stage Linear 4.16 3407.13
Two-Model One-Stage GBT 1.94 3381.76
DR One-Stage Linear 4.11 3406.10
DR One-Stage GBT 2.37 3385.45
Actual - - 0.00 3374.99
TOL: Transformed Outcome Loss on the observed outcomes
RMSE: Root Mean Squared Error on the simulated treatment effect.
The linear model is consistently outperformed by the GBT and, on average, ranks below the constant treatment
effect estimate. The linear model achieves an RMSE of 5.15, 4.16 and 4.11 within the two-model hurdle and the
two-model and doubly-robust one-stage architectures, respectively. The noticeably high RMSE for the two-model
hurdle architecture is the result of treatment effect estimates with high absolute value for a small number of observations.
The good calibration of the linear model may nevertheless ensure its value within a targeting policy.
Under GBT specification, the two-model hurdle architecture compares favorably to the single-model hurdle architecture
and models estimating the overall treatment effect directly. The two-model architecture achieves an RMSE of 1.94 for
both the hurdle and one-stage model, respectively. The single-model architecture, in comparison, achieves an RMSE
of 2.37 and 2.77 for the respective target. The one-stage doubly-robust model with an RMSE of 2.37 performs better
than the single-model architecture but worse than the two-model approach. The results suggest that the single-model
approach, which requires the least number of models to be estimated, provides worse estimates of the treatment effect
than the two-model or DR models. Analysis of the resulting policy profit will clarify if the gap in estimation precision
results in a substantial effect on campaign profit in practice.
Table 5: Campaign profit for CATE-based targeting under population average cost estimates
Architecture Profit FractionTreatedPolicy Stages CATE Model Estimator Conversion Model
Baseline - - - - 46,236 0.00
Analytical - ATE - Conversion Rate 50,830 1.00
Analytical Hurdle Single-Model GBT Conversion Rate 48,840 0.20
Analytical Hurdle Two-Model Linear Conversion Rate 54,550 0.66
Analytical Hurdle Two-Model GBT Conversion Rate 55,590 0.70
Analytical One-Stage Single-Model GBT Conversion Rate 52,795 0.41
Analytical One-Stage Two-Model Linear Conversion Rate 54,456 0.66
Analytical One-Stage Two-Model GBT Conversion Rate 55,146 0.72
Analytical One-Stage DR Linear Conversion Rate 54,459 0.66
Analytical One-Stage DR GBT Conversion Rate 54,629 0.83
Analytical - Actual - Conversion Rate 55,493 0.71
The campaign profit from customer-level targeting provides an interpretable evaluation of the CATE models. Table 5
reports the campaign profit resulting from each CATE model in combination with a constant targeting cost derived from
the population average conversion probability. When applied within a targeting policy, the conclusions drawn from
Table 4 are only partially supported.
The linear models are highly profitable when used as part of a targeting policy. With campaign profit of AC 54,550,
AC 54,456 and AC 54,459, the linear models are superior to the constant treatment estimate with a profit of AC 50,830
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despite their higher RMSE. The linear specification is, however, dominated by the GBT specification for all architectures
except the single-model.
Within the GBT specification, the single-model approach is substantially less profitable than other architectures. The
two-model hurdle model, two-model one-stage model and doubly-robust one-stage model show no substantial difference
at a campaign profit of AC 55,590, AC 55,146 and AC 54,629, respectively. Campaign profit is substantially worse for the
single-model architecture, with a profit of AC 48,840 for the hurdle model and a profit of AC 52,795 for the one-stage
model. The results confirm that small differences in the precision of the CATE estimates have a practically relevant
effect on campaign profit. Despite the hurdle single-model GBT showing a lower RMSE than the ATE baseline in Table
4, it underperforms the baseline of uniform treatment by AC 1,990 when applied for targeting. For all other approaches,
we observe a substantial increase in campaign profit under the analytical targeting policy relative to uniform targeting in
the range of AC 3,626–AC 4,760. With regard to the comparison between the hurdle and one-stage approaches, the results
suggest that the two-stage hurdle model results in campaign profit equivalent to that of the one-stage approaches.
5.3 Profit Implications of the Proposed Analytical Targeting Policy
The analysis has so far addressed the evaluation of the CATE and conversion estimates separately. We now evaluate
the joint impact on campaign profit of the interaction between the proposed treatment and conversion models as
part of a targeting policy. Recall that the single- and two-model hurdle models provide an explicit estimate of the
conversion probability by design. CATE models that estimate the treatment effect on the profit directly require a
separate classification model to predict the conversion rate under treatment.
Table 6: Campaign profit for CATE-based targeting under model-based cost estimation
Architecture Profit FractionTreatedPolicy* Stages CATE Model Conversion Model Estimator
Baseline - - - - 46,236 0.00
Analytical - ATE - Conversion Rate 50,830 1.00
Analytical Hurdle Single-Model - GBT 54,665 0.53
Analytical Hurdle Two-Model - Linear 56,172 0.71
Analytical Hurdle Two-Model - GBT 56,084 0.71
Analytical One-Stage Single-Model Separate GBT 52,881 0.49
Analytical One-Stage Two-Model Separate Linear 56,010 0.66
Analytical One-Stage Two-Model Separate GBT 55,942 0.68
Analytical One-Stage DR Separate Linear 56,028 0.66
Analytical One-Stage DR Separate GBT 55,160 0.75
Empirical Hurdle Single-Model - GBT 53,964 0.78
Empirical Hurdle Two-Model - Linear 54,940 0.73
Empirical Hurdle Two-Model - GBT 55,311 0.70
Empirical One-Stage Single-Model - GBT 54,546 0.69
Empirical One-Stage Two-Model - Linear 54,269 0.68
Empirical One-Stage Two-Model - GBT 55,295 0.70
Empirical One-Stage DR - Linear 54,481 0.67
Empirical One-Stage DR - GBT 54,791 0.83
Empirical denotes targeting based on the profit-maximizing threshold on the training data.
Table 6 reports the campaign profit under the proposed analytical targeting policy and the empirical thresholding policy
introduced in Section 2. Recall that the analytical policy employs the estimated CATE and conversion probability under
treatment to calculate the expected profit from targeting the customer using the decision rule proposed in Eq. 2. The
empirical policy determines the profit-optimal threshold on the CATE estimates through numeric optimization of the
overall campaign profit on the training data. The analytical targeting policy results in a higher campaign profit relative
to the baseline for all model architectures and relative to the empirical policy for seven out of eight architectures.
Comparing model architectures, we find that the proposed causal hurdle framework performs at least comparable to
the combination of a one-stage treatment effect model with a separate conversion model. All architectures under the
analytical and empirical policy increase the campaign profit compared to uniform targeting. Compared to the baseline,
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the analytical policy increases campaign profit by AC 2,051–AC 5,342. The increase in campaign profit by combining
estimates of the CATE and expected cost results in a median additional increase of AC 1,000 over the treatment-based
policy ignoring response-dependent cost reported in Table 5. The campaign profit compared to no targeting lies for
the hurdle architectures in the range of AC 6,645–AC 9,936 and for the one-stage architectures in the range of AC 7,728–
AC 9,075. Comparing within the two-model architectures, which predict the treatment effect most precisely, we find no
substantial difference at a net campaign profit of around AC 9,750 for the hurdle two-model and the one-stage two-model
approach. We also find no substantial difference to the DR approach evaluated as a state-of-the-art competitor one-stage
benchmark.
However, the single-model architecture performs substantially worse than the two-model approaches within the one-
stage and hurdle architectures. This finding is in line with the lower precision of the treatment effect estimates reported
in Table 4. We conclude that the proposed two-model hurdle architecture, although not the single-model hurdle
architecture, achieves competitive campaign profit to the alternative one-stage, distinct modeling architectures. Despite
its disadvantage in estimation, the single-model hurdle architecture improves the effectiveness of the model building
process by reducing the number of models that need to be estimated to two compared to the three to five models required
by the distinct and two-model hurdle architectures.
Comparing the same model architecture under the analytical and empirical targeting policy, the proposed analytical
targeting policy increases campaign profit by an on average AC 1000, excluding the single-model approach due its
weak absolute performance. This result supports the conclusion that the proposed analytical targeting policy increases
campaign profit relative to numeric optimization of the decision threshold. Note, however, that the ratio of customer
treated by the single-model approaches deviates from the other architectures under the analytical policy, but not under
the empirical policy. We interpret these findings as an issue of model calibration for the single-model approach. If either
the probability model or the treatment effect model is not well calibrated, expectation calculations will be inaccurate.
In this case, empirical thresholding can be an alternative to model recalibration on the level of the policy rather than
recalibration of the model estimates. For calibrated models including the GBT when estimated in the two-model
architecture, the analytical targeting policy substantially increases policy profit.
We conclude that the proposed analytical decision policy can substantially increase the profitability of targeting models
in practice and that the proposed two-model hurdle model architecture is an efficient way to estimate the necessary
decision variables in a unified framework.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a general analysis of the customer targeting decision problem under different types of variable costs
and proposed a causal hurdle framework to estimate the relevant decision variables efficiently. Our results demonstrate
that the consideration of treatment cost substantially increases campaign profit when used for customer targeting
independent of whether the treatment effect is considered to vary over customers.
While customer targeting based on expected profit has been used to optimize campaigns, previous analytical frameworks
do not include marketing incentives that are conditioned on a profitable customer response, e.g. a retention offer or
voucher. We identify these common marketing incentives as a type of stochastic variable cost. Our formal analysis
of the targeting decision problem under customer response-dependent costs shows that estimating the expected cost
requires an estimate of the customer response conditional on treatment. A central result to the customer targeting
literature is that profit-optimal targeting often requires modeling the effect of the marketing treatment and the net
customer response under treatment.
In order to estimate the treatment effect and response efficiently, we propose a framework for joint estimation. Our
causal hurdle model combines a hurdle model for customer choice with methods for causal inference. The proposed
approach is feasible with the single-model and two-model approaches for the estimation of conditional treatment effects.
We find that the causal hurdle model under the two-model specification achieves competitive campaign profit on a
coupon targeting campaign in an e-commerce setting, while streamlining model building.
With the increasing relevance of digital marketing and the associated increase in marketing incentives with low targeting-
dependent and high response-dependent variable costs, our results are highly relevant for practitioners. We further
expect the development of efficient approaches for the estimation of flexible hurdle models and the application of our
decision analysis to other applications with stochastic costs as fruitful areas for future research.
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A Relation to Previous Formulations of Churn Campaign Profit
A popular definition of the profit of a customer retention campaign [43, 25, 26] is given by [23]:
Π = Nα [βγ(V − δ − c) + β(1− γ)(−c) + (1− β)(−δ − c)]−A
with
N: Number of customers
α: Ratio of customers targeted
V : The value of the customer to the company, CLV in their original notation
β: Fraction of (targeted) customers who would churn
γ: Fraction of (targeted) customers who decide to remain when receiving the marketing incentive
δ: The cost of the marketing incentive if it is accepted
c: The cost of contacting the customer with the marketing incentive
A: The fixed cost of running the retention campaign
The number of customers targeted by the campaign and the fixed costs are relevant to calculate the overall campaign
profit, but do not affect the targeting decision for a single customer. The profit estimate relevant for customer targeting
is thus the part in square brackets:
pii = βiγi(V−δ) + βi(1− γi)(−c) + (1− βi)(−δ−c)
We will show that this expression is equivalent to the proposed decision policy (Eq. 2) under restrictive assumptions.
Using the additive property of the probabilities βi and (1− βi) and γi and (1− γi), we can summarize the terms:
pii = βiγi(V ) + βiγi(−δ) + (1− βi)(−δ)+βi(−c) + (1− βi)(−c)
= βiγiV + βiγi(−δ) + (1− βi)− δ−c
= βiγiV − δ(βiγi + 1− βi)−c
= βiγiV − δ(1− βi(1− γi))−c
We will target a customer if the profit is positive, i.e.
βiγiV − (1− βi(1− γi))δ − c > 0 (12)
In Eq. 2, we propose the decision rule
pi(1)(V (1)− δ)− c > pi(0) · V (0)
Assuming that the value of the customer is not influenced by the marketing incentive V (1) = V (0) = V allows us the
rearrange the inequality to
(pi(1)− pi(0))V − pi(1)δ − c > 0 (13)
Eq. 12 and Eq. 13 are equivalent if the following equalities hold:
pi(1) = (1− βi(1− γi))
pi(1)− pi(0) = βiγi
In words, we require p(1) to be the complement to the probability for a customer to plan to churn and churn even when
offered the treatment. The complimentary event is for a customer not to plan to churn or to plan to churn but remain
after treatment; or simply, the probability of the customer to stay when given treatment.
We further require p(1)− p(0) to be the probability of a customer to plan to churn and to not churn when offered the
treatment. As βi · γi ∈ [0; 1], this equality holds under the assumption that the treatment effect is strictly positive, i.e.
p(1)− p(0) ∈ [0; 1]. However, we know that the treatment effect on the response probability, p(1)−p(0), is in principle
bounded in [−1, 1] and that negative effects are a critical issue in churn campaigns in practice [10]. Under the previous
campaign profit formulation, we see that βiγi = 0 if either βi or γi or both are zero. In words, the campaign has no effect
if no customers consider to churn or no customers accept the marketing incentive when offered. This conflicts with the
observation that when no customers plan to churn, the campaign may have a net negative effect by priming inattentive
customers to churn. Specifically, the shortcoming of the customer profit proposed by [23] is that it implicitly assumes a
positive treatment effect by restricting the action space of the customer to γ ∈ {Accept treatment,Disregard treatment}.
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We conclude that the proposed decision framework is a generalization of [23]’s campaign profit function to cases where
a customer may react adversely to the treatment. As an alternative formulation to calculate the overall churn campaign
profit, we propose for the general case:
Π =
∑
i∈N
{Ti [(pi(1)− pi(0))Vi − pi(1)δ − c]} −A
In cases with no or little variation in customer sensitivity to the marketing treatment and a constant customer lifetime
value, the churn campaign profit can be simplified to:
Π = Nα [τˆATEV − p(1)δ − c]−A
B Additional Evaluation Results
Table 7 shows the quality of predictions for the conversion probability conditional on treatment. Recall that the
single-model hurdle model includes the treatment indicator as a covariate into the model. The two-model hurdle model
estimates four separate models, one of which predicts the conversion probability within the treatment group. Note
that the default approach, which separates treatment effect estimation and conversion prediction, also requires the
estimation of an identical conversion model. This is the redundancy that the proposed causal hurdle framework avoids.
We find no substantial difference in the area-under-the-ROC-curve (ROC-AUC) or the Brier score, which indicates
model calibration.
Table 7: Quality of model estimates for the prediction of conversion under treatment
Architecture
Stages Specification Estimator ROC-AUC Brier Score
Hurdle/Distinct Two-Model Linear 0.636 0.103
Hurdle/Distinct Two-Model GBT 0.640 0.102
Hurdle Model Single-Model GBT 0.636 0.102
Figure 2 depicts the kernel density plot for the treatment estimation approaches and the GBT specification. We combine
the out-of-sample estimates for each iteration of the cross-validation procedure to obtain out-of-sample estimates for
the full dataset. The dotted line shows the kernel density of the actual ITE.
We observe that no approach fully captures the minor mode of the distribution to the left. The hurdle single-model GBT
approach in addition shows a slight shift from the major mode of the distribution that relates to the worse precision
reported in Table 4.
The support of the linear model specifications extends beyond the actual range of the simulated treatment effects and
beyond the range shown in the figure. For a small set of observations, we observe predicted treatment effects beyond
the range [-100;100] that explain the high statistical error reported in Table 4. For the remaining observations, we
observe a reasonable fit to the actual treatment effect distribution. The general fit explains the profitability of the
linear specification for the targeting policy as observations with weak support, for which linear extrapolation fails, by
definition make up only a minority of cases in the data.
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(a) One-Stage DR Linear (b) Hurdle Two-Model Linear
(c) Hurdle Single-Model GBT (d) Hurdle Two-Model GBT
(e) One-Stage Doubly-Robust GBT (f) One-Stage Two-Model GBT
Figure 2: Kernel density plot of the CATE on the outcome as estimated by the hurdle (top rows) and
one-stage models (bottom). The dotted line shows the actual individual treatment effect.
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